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PEACE ENFORCEMENT:
ARE WE READY TO ENGAGE IN
PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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OPERATIONS

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ABSTRACT

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The end of the cold war and the emergence of the new world order with its instability, presents the United States with many new and complex challenges. The result of this instability has been a quantum increase in the number of peace enforcement operations required to restore peace and security around the world. This study defines peace enforcement and presents it in a context of how we may have to engage in it. It examines our current strategic policies and doctrine to see if we have sufficient guidance as to why and when we may engage in these operations. This paper also reviews our current resources to see if we have enough forces to participate in these operations.

Introduction

The end of the cold war and the emergence of the new world order presents the United States with many new and complex challenges. The saying "the future, it ain't what it used to be" summarizes this situation well.¹ While defining the main threat to the United States, the bipolar balance of power during the cold war, did create some stability throughout the world. The break up of the former Soviet Union has generated a tremendous amount of instability. This has caused the United States Government with its National Command Authority, and our allies, to continually try to redefine the new threats to us and our national interests.

The result of this instability has been a quantum increase in the number of military operations required to achieve or restore peace and security. These are classified as peace operations but more specifically they are mostly peace enforcement operations. While this will be discussed in more detail later, peace enforcement is military combat operations, or the threat of them used to restore or enforce peace. In the past ten years, the United States military has engaged in several peace and peace enforcement operations with global implications. These operations included Panama, the Middle East (Gulf War), and Somalia.

This instability has been felt at home too. The United States faces a critical economic situation that has sent shock waves throughout the government and the country. The defense budget has been reduced drastically and in turn has produced a

tremendous reduction in U.S. military capability. The Department of Defense is also revising the military doctrine to reflect the downsizing of forces and increased participation in peace and peace enforcement operations. The National Command Authority and the Congress are reviewing, debating and revising the strategic policies on peace operations. These policies will provide the necessary guidance on how the U.S. should conduct itself in peace operations as a world leader. Because of all of this, the question begins to form about whether we, as a nation, should be involved in all these crises around the world. The answer I believe is that as a world leader the U.S. has to be willing to exercise leadership and be participatory or risk losing credibility.

With a rapidly changing and unstable world environment, the concerning issue is do we, as a nation, have the policies, doctrine and resources to successfully accomplish peace enforcement missions. In essence, are we ready to engage in peace enforcement operations?

What I will present in this paper is a discussion on:

- * Defining what peace enforcement really is.
- * The context in which we, as a nation, may be expected to engage in this type of operation.
- * Does Presidential Decision Directive 25, the National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy clearly state why and when the U.S. would engage in peace enforcement operations?
- * Do we, as a nation, have the resources in manpower and

equipment to conduct peace enforcement operations?

* Do we, in the military, have the doctrine to support our training for peace enforcement operations?

* A conclusion on whether we, as a nation, are in fact ready to meet these challenges.

Casper Weinberger once said that "in today's world the line between peace and war is less clearly drawn than at anytime in our history."² This was true when stated in 1984 and today that "line" is even less distinct.³ The United States is being increasingly called upon in its leadership role to participate in peace enforcement operations. What this means is, with a reduction in resources, the U.S., will now have to rely heavily on the use of regional organizations and partnerships, coalitions, and the United Nations to help bring resolution to the challenging situations that arise. The days of our incessant unilateral actions are quickly fading or gone forever. However, history has shown that U.S. involvement in most of these situations will inevitably include some form of military participation or peace operations.

Of the several operations that fall into the category of peace operations, the most challenging situation is peace enforcement. The U.S. is extremely susceptible to be called upon to participate in this endeavor. To commit ourselves to participate in a peace enforcement operation is a decision of the highest order for the National Command Authority and our nation.

The first issue is to define peace enforcement. It is also important to discern the environment of peace enforcement and how it differs from other operations such as peacekeeping.

Defining Peace Enforcement

In order to understand the challenges that may be confronted in undertaking a peace enforcement operation, it is vital to achieve an agreement on the definition of the term. As it will be shown, this is not an easy task.

To begin to define peace enforcement it must first be understood that it belongs to the broader category of peace operations. Peace Operations are defined as "operations that encompass peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace."⁴ These are two widely different operations. In peacekeeping there is already a recognized peace in place. The force that undertakes such a mission is usually a lightly armed force designed to report and monitor the instruments of the agreed to peace. Although, in peace enforcement, a peace may exist, it is more likely that one must be established. The force that participates in this type of mission must be heavily armed and prepared to engage in full combat operations to compel peace. A further examination is required of what peace enforcement means.

The United Nations Secretary General Boutros-Ghali refers to peace enforcement as "actions taken to prevent a cease-fire from

being violated or to reinstate a failed cease-fire.⁵ The key factors here are that, within this definition, there is a presumption that peace either exists or has recently existed and that at least one or both sides in a dispute wish to have peace. While this can apply to a broad spectrum of disputes or conflicts, it may not be accurate enough to fully understand its implications. Before committing troops for this type of operation, it is preferred that peace be the desire of one or all parties. Hostilities must have ceased so that a force can be inserted to enforce that peace. However, as recently seen in the Balkans, one or all sides may not initially be willing to have or want peace. Therefore, a more precise definition is required.

In U.S. joint doctrine, peace enforcement is described in terms of "the application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order."⁶ This illustrates a clear distinction between what is envisioned by the United Nations Secretary General and the National Command Authority of the United States. While it is desirable to have all sides of an issue to want peace, there is clearly the potential that in some circumstances at least one or all sides do not. The use of force, or the threat of it may then be required to compel or establish peace and stability to further the peace process. All elements of power including military force must be brought to bear should hostilities continue. When this occurs, however, those military

forces who are conducting the operation will lose their impartiality, which is critical to help the peace process. They then incur the risk of becoming the enemy for one or all sides involved. This will be a most tenuous environment despite all appropriate security measures taken. For the purposes of discussion in this paper, I will use the U.S. joint definition of peace enforcement.

The Peace Enforcement Context

Peace Enforcement could involve any number of operations, which fall short of war to enforce a peace. However, what sets this type of operation apart from all other forms of peace operations is that peace enforcement could include actual combat operations. I will now address two situations in which this type of operation could occur.

Today, in the Balkans, there is a situation where there are three potential warring factions, the Serbs, Croats, and the Muslims. This is a situation where, after being suppressed by communist rule for several decades, ethnicity, religion, and neonationalism erupted into bloody conflict.⁷ The European countries and the United States, who were extremely concerned about the conflict spreading and destabilizing the region, appealed to the United Nations who responded with a mandate and sanctions against this conflict. These actions provided the legitimacy for countries outside the conflict to take action that included the introduction of military forces. The coalition was

initially provided by several countries including France and the United Kingdom who made up the bulk of the forces. The challenge that these forces encountered was that they were trying to enforce a peace where at least one or more of the belligerents did not really want peace. The result was that the peace enforcers were now just in the way. The harder they attempted to accomplish their mission the more impartiality they lost; consequently, they became an enemy to one or more sides. This situation along with a lack of overwhelming combat power and extended lines of communication seriously degraded the forces' capabilities for success. I should also point out that a successful endstate was not clearly defined as perhaps it should have before entering the conflict. But the most significant deficiency was the loss of impartiality. The point to be made here is upon committing forces of any kind to a peace enforcement type of operation, they must have a clearly defined endstate and enough combat power to compel a peace, even if it means initially engaging in combat operations with one or all sides. There must also be a sincere possibility of peace occurring with the cessation of hostilities. If there is not going to be a peace to enforce, then it's not time to engage forces. However, once forces are engaged, they along with all other elements of power, must make every effort to cause a cessation of hostilities and stabilize the situation as expeditiously as possible. The reason for this is, as stated earlier, the peace enforcement force upon engaging in combat operations will lose impartiality with one or

all sides. Even if this force has significant combat power to bring an end to hostile actions, they cannot now try to embark on long term peace operations. They should be removed as quickly as possible and a peacekeeping force must be inserted. This force should preferably be one who did not participate in the initial operation and may have to be from another country altogether. Only through maintaining impartiality can a lasting peace and stability be achieved.

Another possibility of why forces could be introduced for peace enforcement resembles what was encountered in Somalia. When this situation was encountered, there was a lack of any type of formal government at all. In this environment, instead of having to separate two or more recognized groups or organizations, a force may have to separate two or more gangs or guerrilla groups. In this predicament one additional challenge politically will be to determine which group(s) to recognize and how to deal with them. Any formal contact could be perceived as providing legitimacy and thereby create at least the perception of a form of government. In this case, perhaps limited objectives can be realized which may or may not involve enforcing the overall peace such as, securing food and medical convoys and preventing bandits from pilfering warehouses. This may begin to establish some form of stability, but in the short term, doesn't do much to bring lasting peace. Cases like this may in fact be ones where there is no peace to enforce. While this is unfortunate, there may not be much that can be done until the

people throughout the country desire a more peaceful environment than the one they currently have.

Peace Enforcement Scenario

This is an illustration of how a peace enforcement operation could be carried out. The conditions are, two belligerent forces from two different countries engaged in hostile actions against each other. The neighboring countries have requested and received from the U.N. a mandate which sanctions military action by outside forces. One of the belligerent countries desires peace but will continue to defend itself until hostilities have ceased. A peace enforcement force could then be inserted between the two belligerent forces to create the following conditions, which must be spelled out in the U.N. mandate. Initially this force would be inserted to separate the belligerents and create a Buffer Zone (BZ) with a United Nations Military Demarkation Line (UNMDL). The intent is to separate the forces and have them withdraw far enough away from each other to prevent any recurrence of hostilities. Also, the military demarkation line may turn out to be a new negotiated boundary or border. The Buffer Zone would extend on both sides of the military demarkation line. Only light reconnaissance forces with small arms can be in the Buffer Zone but no forces could be positioned or stationed there. The next area is Control Zone A (CZA). This zone further separates the forces on both sides of the BZ. In

this zone, some forces can be positioned or stationed (total size and type should be specified). Armored forces, artillery, and heavy mortars (a caliber should be specified) should be precluded. Finally, there is Control Zone B (CZB). This zone, which is also on both sides of CZA, allows for additional forces to be positioned or stationed (total size should be specified). Again, artillery and heavy mortars (a caliber should be specified) should continue to be precluded. A diagram of how this would look graphically is as follows:




Figure 1.

While the sanctions indicated in this example perhaps involve matters below the strategic level, they must be incorporated into

the strategic level discussions prior to their development.

Failure to address them will jeopardize the success of the operation.

The conditions then, where peace enforcement operations could be conducted should be viewed as uncertain. The use of combat forces may be required to compel the belligerents to cease hostilities. There must, however, be a peace to keep. This means that at least one of the sides involved in the dispute must desire peace and be willing to stop fighting. Finally, there must be legitimacy for this type of action by having international resolutions and or sanctions put in place. Anything short of these conditions will endanger the success of this type of mission.

Current U.S. Policies

Next, an examination of current policies regarding the involvement of U.S. forces in peace enforcement operations is required. To compound this task, it must be realized that technology and the advent of almost instantaneous broadcasts of global tragedies and dilemmas by CNN and other international news media into the majority of the homes in America, has and will continue to cause segments of the American people to demand that we, the U.S. Government, "do something" to alleviate the crisis. The potential exists for the National Command Authority to engage the United States to "do something" perhaps before the potential long term implications have been realized. This could in effect

cause our National Command Authority to create a policy of what is termed "ad hocracy," where, the U.S. reacts without establishing an over arching framework for determining why and when to take action and more specifically what type of action(s) to take.⁸ Fortunately, I believe that with Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25, the National Security Strategy, and the National Military Strategy, there is at least the beginning of an over arching framework. While I have focused on peace enforcement operations, they are but one type of operation that falls under the category of peace operations. The PDD applies to all types of peace operations and not just peace enforcement.

PDD 25 provides broad guidance on why and how the United States would engage in multilateral peace operations. It provides progressive guidance on sets of factors for supporting peace operations, for participating in peace operations, and for participating when operations are likely to involve combat or peace enforcement as follows.

The PDD provides several factors for why the United States should support peace operations. They include:

- * Multilateral involvement advances U.S. interests;
- * International interest exists in dealing with the problem multilaterally;
- * Conflict represents a threat to or breach of international peace and security;
- * Operation has clear objectives;
- * For peace enforcement operations, a significant threat

exists to international peace and security;

- * Forces, financing, and appropriate mandate are available;
- * Inaction is judged to result in unacceptable political, humanitarian, and economic consequences;
- * Operation's duration is tied to clear objectives and realistic criteria.

The PDD also states the factors for why the United States should participate in peace operations, which include:

- * Participating advances U.S. interests;
- * Risks to American personnel are considered acceptable;
- * Personnel, funds and other resources are available;
- * U.S. participation deemed necessary for operation's success;
- * Role of U.S. forces tied to clear objectives;
- * Endpoint of U.S. participation can be identified;
- * U.S. public and U.S. Congress support operation;
- * Command and control arrangements are acceptable.

Finally, factors for why the United States should participate when operations are likely to involve combat include:

- * There is a clear determination to commit sufficient forces to achieve clearly defined objectives;
- * Plan will achieve objectives decisively;
- * There is a commitment to reassess or adjust size, composition, and disposition of forces if necessary.⁹

Upon review of these factors it could be concluded that the U.S. will never commit U.S. forces for peace enforcement

operations. The reality is, however, that military force has proven to be the most capable to respond expeditiously. The use of military force early on can provide the deterrence necessary to prevent the situation from deteriorating further. Its use or threat of it may facilitate a successful outcome to a crisis and perhaps without engaging in combat operations.

The main points specified within PDD 25 are: 1.) What are the U.S. interests that are being affected? 2.) Are there clearly defined objectives to include an endstate? 3.) Is there a mandate or sanction which authorizes this action? 4.) What are the risks to U.S. personnel? The United States National Command Authority and the Department of Defense have learned some hard lessons which have cost valuable lives. The U.S. cannot participate in every crisis that arises. Therefore, these criteria must be applied and each situation stringently analyzed to determine if the United States will participate and if so, in what capacity. This PDD, while not all encompassing, does provide adequate safeguards, yet is flexible enough to have a broad application to various situations. One final point is that although PDD 25 does not define what peace or peace enforcement operations are, the definitions utilized here in this document do apply.

In the National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, it states that "our strategy calls for the preparation and deployment of military forces within the U.S. and abroad to support U.S. diplomacy in responding to key dangers

including weapons of mass destruction, regional aggression, and threats to the stability of states."¹⁰ Also, as indicated in PDD 25 this document states that before deciding whether to participate in a situation with our military forces, the National Command Authority will closely evaluate the situation against our national interests. It then defines our national interests as generally falling into three categories. They are vital interests, clearly significant interests, and humanitarian interests. Vital interests, are ones "which are of broad overriding importance to the survival, security, and vitality of our national entity-the defense of U.S. territory, citizens, allies, and economic well being."¹¹ The second category includes interests that are not vital but are clearly significant. "That is, interests which do not affect our national survival, but, do affect importantly our national well-being and the character of the world in which we live."¹² The third category primarily involves humanitarian interests. In this last category, military forces are desired for the resources they possess rather than the application of combat power.¹³ The key here is that our national interests will dictate whether or not to use military force and when. This document further discusses peace operations. While it does not present a definition of peace operations, it does state that multilateral peace operations, including peacekeeping and peace enforcement, are a critical component of our strategy.¹⁴ As I have stated earlier in my discussion of PDD 25, the lessons of the past are being applied and this is the case.

here too.

The U.S. is working closely with the U.N. and other member states to ensure that we collectively embark on only those missions which make sense politically and militarily and that can be accomplished successfully.¹⁵ This last statement may cause the U.S. National Command Authority and the American people to ask, well, why get involved at all. The answer to this can be found in situations such as Somalia. Specifically, in this case U.S. forces proved that humanitarian operations, to alleviate the crisis of starvation, can be conducted with reasonable success despite the nonexistence of a central government or an organized infrastructure. However, if there is no consensus of the people on issues of peace, no military force can persuade the people to accept an outside solution, short of physically taking control of the entire country.

The National Security Strategy also addresses the highly controversial issue of command and control when participating in United Nations operations. Its controversy lies in the fact that as a superpower nation, our National Command Authority has decided that we will not allow another nation, who may be in command of a U.N. operation, to involve the U.S. in a situation beyond which it initially subscribed to do. Therefore, the National Command Authority has stated that there may be occasions where U.S. troops may be placed under temporary operational control of a competent U.N. or allied commander. However, "under no circumstances will the President (as Commander in Chief) ever

relinquish his command authority over U.S. forces."¹⁶ While this policy remains controversial, it has enabled the National Command Authority to maintain control of our destiny in multilateral operations.

As illustrated here, peace operations including peace enforcement operations are an important means to support the national security strategy. However, they are not a strategy unto themselves.¹⁷

The National Military Strategy, A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement states that there are three components to this strategy which are peacetime engagement, deterrence and conflict prevention, and fighting and winning our nations wars.¹⁸ Within these components, peace enforcement falls under deterrence and conflict prevention. While this indicates that this is primarily a military mission it must be executed in synchronization with all elements of national power. The United States is making a strong statement to any potential adversary that aggression will be defeated.¹⁹ Within the strategy it also states that U.S. forces must be prepared to participate in peace enforcement operations when directed. It acknowledges the fact that this type of operation falls into a "gray zone between peace and war."²⁰ As such, it is imperative for the National Command Authority to be extremely selective in deciding if and when to engage in such operations. The guidelines that were initially set forth in PDD 25 apply here. They are, first to "commit sufficient forces to achieve clearly defined objectives. Second,

plan to achieve those objectives decisively. Finally, to reassess and adjust, as necessary, the size, composition, and disposition of our forces to achieve our objectives."²¹

As stated earlier, U.S. military forces have proven to be the most capable to respond expeditiously. The use of military force or the threat of it can provide the deterrence necessary to prevent the situation from deteriorating further and to facilitate a successful outcome, perhaps without engaging in combat operations.

The U.S. national military strategy follows the guidance set forth previously and allows for flexible application of military force in support of our national interests and any objectives that are established for a particular operation. All of our military forces continue to apply lessons learned from their most recent experiences to continue to improve their capabilities in executing peace enforcement operations.

Resources

As previously stated in the introduction, the current budget deficit has caused all elements within the U.S. government to reassess their mission and to reduce expenditures. The Department of Defense has been no exception to this and in fact has incurred the majority of the reductions in government spending to date. The significant effect of this action, has been for all of the services to reduce in size, proportional to their reduced budgets. Just within the U.S. Army the force has

downsized from approximately 780,000 in 1988 to where it stands today at about 495,000. There are some who believe that this isn't so bad. In a world where the cold war has ended, at least for now, there isn't a need for a large military or perhaps not one at all. The reality, however, has been an increase in crises where the U.S. has committed forces in peace enforcement operations. By definition, peace enforcement may involve actual combat operations or the threat thereof. Examples include, Operations Provide Comfort and Southern Watch which are still active in Iraq today. These operations by U.S. and allied forces are a demonstration that we are prepared to engage in peace enforcement operations.²² U.S. forces are having increased requirements to project military power and show U.S. resolve, but with fewer forces. This has tremendously increased the Operational Tempo (OPTEMPO) resulting in a serious impact on our overall readiness.

Just within the U.S. Army, challenging decisions have had to be made on the type and amount of forces to maintain on active duty and to place within the reserves. One of the results of these decisions has been the placement of the majority of the Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations units within the reserves. These forces have proven to be profoundly important in executing peace enforcement and all other types of peace operations. Their early employment in many situations have prevented actual combat and paved the way for successful crisis termination. Also these forces have to continually be activated

from the reserves which incurs a strain on the civilian employment and family life of the reserve soldier. It must be recognized that in order to remain a world superpower, we, as a nation, must maintain a highly trained combat ready force that is sufficient in size to meet our requirements world wide. This would include maintaining more of the Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations units in the active force. These forces are worth the expenditure of money versus the potential cost in human lives of our soldiers. Currently, the United States sits on the edge of not having enough forces to accomplish missions required of us. The United States cannot afford to downsize more and in fact we may have already downsized too far. There is continual pressure from the Congress to cut additional funds for the Department of Defense (DOD) which could result in additional downsizing of forces. The Congress must realize that resolution on the size of the defense budget and the size of military this country requires is vital to our national security. An agreement on a not lower than minimum size must be reached soon. Continual budget cutting will have a detrimental effect on force readiness and morale, which could ultimately diminish our posture as a world leader.

Doctrine

As U.S. forces continue to train, gain new insights through technology, and participate in peace enforcement missions the doctrine continues to evolve. As peace enforcement encompasses

combat operations, the U.S. military forces have and continue to update their doctrine on how they fight. Joint publications are also evolving on how to fight as a joint force to realize the full synergistic effect of the military resources. There are some differences in conducting peace enforcement operations and these differences are being addressed in doctrine. Joint Pub 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations provides concepts, for how to conduct joint operations. The Joint Pub 3-07 series on Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, provides definitions and concepts for all types of military operations other than war, including peace and peace enforcement operations. The U.S. Army published FM 100-23, Peace Operations, which provides fundamentals, command and control arrangements, and planning considerations for the whole wide-range of peace operations, including peace enforcement. These documents along with all of the other doctrinal publications have proven to be sufficient. All U.S. military forces must continually update and revise their doctrine as they apply new technology, engage in world crises, and adapt to domestic factors. Applying lessons learned will continue to be a crucial part of this long term process.

Conclusion

Since the end of the cold war, the world has changed significantly. Instability and conflict around the world will

continue, causing an increase in peace enforcement operations well into the foreseeable future. Each crisis will be completely different and present its own unique challenges. The National Command Authority must carefully scrutinize each situation and analyze it against our national interests to determine first, if the U.S. will even become involved. Secondly, if the U.S. is to become involved, to what extent and what elements of power will be used. Finally, if the situation calls for the use of U.S. military force, or the threat of its use, there needs to be clearly defined objectives with an endstate for the withdraw of U.S. forces. The command and control arrangements must be agreeable. The National Command Authority and the U.S. military forces must continue to be prepared to meet these challenges.

The U.S. current policies with PDD 25, the National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, and the National Military Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement have proven to be sufficient guidance for determining U.S. involvement in peace enforcement operations. These documents, must however, be reviewed and revised as deemed necessary, to account for new crises that will continually arise. Also, lessons learned must be applied not only from the U.S. experiences but from the experiences of other nations executing peace enforcement missions. Only through this process will the National Command Authority and the military forces be able to determine the guidance and doctrine needed to execute this type of mission. Whether the United States should engage in peace enforcement

operations, with the clear potential for combat operations, will continue to be a significant decision for our National Command Authority. This is a decision, which cannot be taken lightly, and is one in which the United States must control its own destiny.

Resources for peace enforcement type operations within the United States and globally are becoming scarce. The U.S. cannot expect to be able to participate in every crisis especially unilaterally. I would conclude therefore that the U.S. continue to rely on the United Nations, regional organizations and partnerships, and coalitions to respond to the crises that arise. I also conclude that the U.S. military force structure be maintained at current levels. This current force structure is right at the edge of being able to successfully accomplish the assigned requirements and responsibilities. A strong argument can be made that the overall force structure may have already been reduced too far. A third conclusion is that the Congress and DOD must come to resolution as soon as possible on the stabilization of the defense budget and force structure size in order to maintain our status in world affairs. The continued potential future budget cuts can only have a detrimental impact.

The joint and army doctrine are currently sufficient to enable our forces to train and fight. They are evolving and must continue to do so. Peace enforcement operations as with all other operations have to be approached jointly to realize the full synergistic effect of all of the military resources. It is

important that new doctrine specifically for peace enforcement be developed, particularly with its potential for combat operations. However, it must be remembered that the primary mission for our armed forces is to fight and win our nation's wars and not peace enforcement operations. Thus, doctrine while accounting for the nuances of peace enforcement must also be structured to prepare our forces to fight and win our nations wars.²³

Finally, we, as a nation are ready to engage in peace enforcement operations. There are challenges both internal to the nation and globally. These challenges must constantly be addressed. It is imperative for us, as a nation to remember that as crises dictate, the U.S. can and will support nations around the world in achieving peace and stability by participating in peace enforcement operations. Nevertheless, it is the responsibility of the people of a country in question to ultimately want peace in order for peace to exist.²⁴

Endnotes

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11. Ibid., 12.
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13. Ibid., 12.
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19. Ibid., ii.

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